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on the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Stalin's article and speech, Malenkov's "report", speeches by Beriya, Molotov, Voroshilov. Also, "greetings" of foreign Communist parties.

1. Preliminary remarks. The following are first draft reactions of a person who does not have the flow of current official information and interpretation necessary for a full analysis. Besides, I have not had time for a real analysis. That would require many days, much comparing of texts, tracing back of the latest "line" to its roots, and lots of discussion. The following is somewhat impressionistic.

2. General observations and suggestions. The 19th Congress materials are the fullest in years. Obviously they are vastly important even if they contain little that is "new." They cannot be laughed off or ignored. They present a systematic, organized combination of basic doctrine and opportunistic propaganda, all in a political setting which gives them weight and dignity. It would be interesting to compare them, for logic, propaganda effectiveness, and general applicability to the domestic and world audience, to our current election campaign. We need not fear the comparison.

Why was the Congress held at this time? A satisfactory answer would illuminate its significance considerably. That the Kremlin has been considering holding a new congress, and altering the "general line" for a long time is obvious. Malenkov in his speech at the Cominform

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founding in 1947 (published, I believe, in December of that year) promised a revision of the program. As antorkhanov recently pointed out in Svobodny Kankoz, the logical time for a congress would have been 1945. But the bad internal condition of the S.U. and Stalin's feeling that things were in a state of flux internationally caused him to "wait and see."

Does the Congress "sum up" an historical" period? There may be a direct connection between the Congress and our election. In any case, the new President should have the "answers" to the policies laid down at the Congress. They present a system of challenges which he must meet.

3. Does the "Congress line" represent anything new? Americans tend to look for sensations. Other peoples, especially orientals, are more accustomed to ritual, to ritualistic behavior. We may overlook important problems in our disappointment at the Congress' lack of "novelty." I feel anyway that at least a new emphasis was achieved. True, even this was based on lines set forth in the last year or two.

What are the new emphases?

A. "Split America from its allies." The concept of the "Anglo-American bloc" has not been dropped, though now it's the "Amerikano-Angliski blok", and most of the references to the "enemy" are to "American imperialism," etc. A good deal of the material is devoted to showing how America is stealing British markets, to the "contradictions" between the US and Britain.

It would be interesting to compare the "Congress line" with the "Cominform line" set forth in Zhdavon's September 1947 speech in

Poland. My impression is that there the "two camps" thesis was set forth more urgently, and differently. Zhdaven's intention was to alert the Communist camp to the first effective resistance efforts of the West. Now Malenkov and Stalin are trying to exploit the frictions attending a later stage in the development of these efforts.

B. Reaction to Korea. I looked carefully for Korea references. The explanation consistently given for the war is, simply, that the US "attacked" Korea. Why? There are several references to the desire to overcome internal economic difficulties. As far as I could find, no word about future policy in Korea, except expressions of sympathy for the Koreans and Chinese. Incidentally, the Chinese get lots of honor, but so does the "Mongolian Peoples' Republic."

Looking at the larger themes of the material, one guesses that a major motif is concern over US rearmament caused by Korea. It is also interesting to speculate why nothing--unless I missed it--on the unwillingness of Chinese POW's to return! This might be worth a special study. There may be opportunities there.

4. Problems of Trade. What stands out almost above all other themes in Stalin's article and Malenkov's speech is the disappearance of the "single world market." Stalin rather inconsistently attributes it to the World War II. In his threat of Eastern bloc "dumping"--is this a colossal but cunning bluff?ⁱⁿ--and/his prediction that loss of markets is bound to increase the difficulties of capitalism, Stalin attempts to scare Western businessmen. What I am not sure of is whether all this in Stalin and Malenkov is a cry of pain as the result of the US "blockade" or partly that and partly or mainly announcement of intention to exploit

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difficulties caused by our policies. This theme deserves careful study and rebuttal as it appeals to the pocketbook. This dates to San Francisco (1945) and Moscow, April 1952, at least.

5. Prosperity, Inflation, Depression. As in March 1939, in Stalin's "report", this Congress also attempts to exploit inflation caused by war preparation and the depression (crisis) which, we are warned, is bound to result from the war boom. The line seems strikingly similar, as applied to the Fascist states in 1939 and to the US today. It probably has much "resonance," especially among Bevanites and others who do not tire of saying that when the US economy catches cold they get pneumonia.

6. War and Peace. As usual, the major problem. Unlike in 1939, the Congress speakers did not refer to a war in progress. Apparently Korea is an "act of aggression", not a war. Why? The main line is that the US is preparing for and needs war to secure profits, markets, and world domination. To achieve this, it has militarized its economy, and that of the other "capitalist" countries, and has forced the latter to adopt "Fascist" regimes. This latter line is in part a reflection of defensive measures of the French and other governments against Communist tactics. Does it, together with Stalin's expressions of sympathy with foreign Communists, indicate concern with poor morale in the international Communist movement?

The nonsense about the "inevitability" of war among capitalist countries should be carefully compared with Malenkov's, Molotov's and

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Beria's call for increased Soviet military strength, etc. to defend against American aggressive plans." There is plenty of inconsistency. An American campaign, unrelentingly, for real disarmament, demands, as at the UN for investigation of Soviet "germ warfare" charges, and in general exploitation of the gap between Soviet word and deed, seems the answer.

7. "Colonialism" Stalin's thesis on the revolution, any importance of the peasantry and Beria's seductive economic comparisons between the Soviet and non-Soviet East deserve the most serious attention. Some good material exposing Soviet claims in this area is being published in the Munich refugee publication, 'Tirkeli'.

8. Foreign Comments. The "greetings", from Paraguay, Japan, San Marino (!) etc., deserve careful attention.